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This Thesis has two themes:  (1)  political economy of international trade and factor mo-
bility policy; (2)  the robustness of strategic trade and industrial policy. 
Chapter 1 is  a non-technical introduction of my research. 
In Chapter 2,  Double-edged incentive competition for  FDI, we  study the impact of 
special interest lobbying on competition between two  countries for  a  multinational in a 
common agency framework.  \Ve address the following questions.  On the positive side, is 
special interest lobbying a  determinant of competition for FDI? If so,  how does it work? 
How does it affect the equilibrium price for attracting FDI? On the normative side, what 
are the welfare effects of FDI competition when special interest lobbying is  present?  Is 
allocative efficiency always achieved? We argue that special interest lobbying provides an 
extra political incentive for a government to attract FDI. We show that compared to the 
benchmark case when governments maximize national welfare,  now (1)  an economically 
disadvantageous country has a  chance to win the competition;  (2)  the equilibrium price 
for  attracting FDI is  higher than in the benchmark case;  (3)  allocative efficiency cannot 
be always achieved. 
In Chapter 3,  Advertising in a  differentiated duopoly and its policy implications for 
an open economy, we develop a model of advertising in a differentiated duopoly in which 
firms first  decide how much to invest  in cooperative or predatory advertising and then 
engage in product market competition (Cournot or Bertrand).  We then use this model, 
with the type of advertising endogenously determined, to explore the policy implications 
in the context of a Brander-Spencer third-country model of strategic trade.  Among results 
derived from this model, most interestingly we show that for a  range of parameter values 
we get robust trade policy in which governments always use a  trade subsidy irrespective 
of the type of advertising or form of market competition. 
In  Chapter 4,  Is  export  subsidy a  robust  trade policy  recommendation towards  a 
unionized duopoly, we argue that although previous researches imply that the robust trade 
policy recommendation towards a unionized duopoly is an export subsidy, we cannot get 
such a result even in the linear case if the opportunity cost of public funds is sufficiently 
high.  However, if we consider the case where the domestic firm and the trade union lobby 
the government to set their favorable  trade policies by giving the government political 
contributions (modeled in a common agency setting), then the result of robustness will be 
restored if the government cares about the political contributions sufficiently relative to 
national welfare. 
See Chapter 5 for some technical proofs. 
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x always achieved.  However, we show that all of these results can be reversed when special 
interest politics is present. 
To the best of our knowledge,  Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) is  the only other paper 
to study the bidding war for a firm from a political economy perspective. In their paper, 
elected officials have re-election concerns, which make their willingness to pay for attracting 
a  firm  differ  from  voters'  willingness  to pay for  that.  They derive a  similar result to 
ours:  the allocation of FDI may be inefficient.  However,  this research  and theirs are 
complements rather than substitutes. The driving force  of our model is  special interest 
politics, whilst the driving force of their model is politicians' re-election concerns.  Our and 
their papers together send a message that political factors have big impact on competition 
for  FDI. In Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997)  the voters are assumed to be symmetric vis-a-
vis the investment project; there are no conflicts of interest among them.  Notice that the 
redistribution effects of FDI are considered explicitly in this paper. 
The second theme is  the robustness of strategic trade and industrial policy.  Strategic 
trade policy has become a core part of international trade policy analysis since the seminal 
paper by Brander and Spencer  (1985)  was  published.  However,  despite a  voluminous 
literature since then,  the policy implications remain controversial,  mainly because the 
trade policy recommendation is  very sensitive to the market  conduct,  with an export 
subsidy being recommended with Cournot competition and an export tax with Bertrand. 
Recent studies, such as Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Maggi (1996) and Leahy and Neary 
(2001) show that if firms engage in strategic investment competition (e.g., for R&D or ca-
pacity) prior to product market competition, then industrial policy, in the form of an in-
vestment subsidy, would be robust to the form of market conduct. Neary and Leahy (2000) 
develop a general framework to analyze optimal intervention towards dynamic oligopoly, 
emphasizing the implications of different kinds of government commitment.  They point 
out that when firms make strategic investments prior to product market competition, the 
first-best  policy combination should be designed for  both profit-shifting and correcting 
the socially wasteful strategic behavior of the domestic firm to influence the decisions of 
its rival and the domestic government.  They also  argue that a  general model may not 
be useful in providing a  general guide to policy making, and that it might be better to 
conduct case studies of particular policy combinations.  Advertising is  a fruitful field for 
such a case study, since its policy implications in the context of strategic trade policy have 
not been much explored. 
In the second paper, "Advertising in a differentiated duopoly and its policy implications 
for an open economy", joint with Alistair Ulph, we first construct a model of advertising 
3 factors:  an opportunity cost of public funds;  and special interest lobbying. 
I begin with a linear model in which following Brander and Spencer (1988), I introduce 
a  trade union to a  Brander-Spencer third-market model  for  one of the two  exporting 
countries,  say,  the 'domestic country',  and consider the case of unilateral intervention. 
In this model, I reproduce the result of robustness implied by the above two papers in a 
clear-cut way.  I.e., the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy irrespective of the form of 
market conduct.  This serves as a benchmark case.  Then, I introduce an opportunity cost 
of public funds to the above setting. Now even in the linear case, an export subsidy cannot 
be a  robust trade policy recommendation if this cost is  sufficiently high.  Then, I  allow 
the domestic firm and the trade union to lobby for  their favorable policies by giving the 
domestic government political contributions prior to the government setting a trade policy. 
This is modeled as  a  common agency framework developed by Bernheim and Whinston 
(1986),  and Grossman and Helpman (1994).  I  show that an export subsidy is  a  robust 
policy recommendation irrespective of the form of market conduct if the government cares 
about political contributions sufficiently relative to national welfare. 
So,  what is  the main lesson that I have learnt from this simple exercise?  First of all, 
in the absence of political factors, an export subsidy can hardly be a robust trade policy 
recommendation towards a unionized duopoly:  the optimal policy is very sensitive to the 
opportunity cost of public funds.  However,  an export subsidy can be a  robust  policy 
recommendation when political factors (such as special interest lobbying) are present. 
As far as I know, my paper is the first to consider the effect of both an opportunity cost 
of public funds and special interest lobbying on strategic trade policy towards a unionized 
duopoly.  Matsuyama (1990), followed notably by Neary (1994), introduce a social cost of 
public funds to the strategic trade policy literature. They do not consider special interest 
lobbying.  Fung and Lin (2000) use a common agency approach to studying strategic trade 
policy from a political economy perspective.  They do not include an opportunity cost of 
public funds. 
5 means that governments can be very sensitive to special interest lobbying.  On the other 
hand, special interest groups, such as domestic firms and trade unions have an incentive 
to engage in lobbying.  To  understand this,  notice that when the export subsidy is  set 
sufficiently big,  then the foreign firm would be driven out of the third-country market, 
and domestic firms and trade unions would gain from a monopoly market structure.  So, 
our result derived from the simplest model could be reproduced in a more sophisticated 
model. 
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